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INTRODUCTION
The uncharted rock on which our ship ran aground 
is just one fragment of an entire world we have yet to 
perceive.
(Winter, 2010)
Because of its hazardous ice conditions, the Canadian Arc-
tic was a latecomer to the burgeoning polar cruise indus-
try: the first cruise was offered in 1984. Since 2006, some 
regions, especially the Northwest Passage, have witnessed 
considerable growth in this sector. Despite this growth, 
cruise operators in Arctic Canada have kept a good human 
safety profile, although there is a “lengthy record and anec-
dotal history of groundings and other bumbles” (Jones, 
1999:31). In August 1996, for example, the Hanseatic ran 
aground in the Simpson Strait, perforating two of the ship’s 
fuel reservoirs, and all 153 passengers had to be evacu-
ated by helicopter (Grenier, 2004). The latest of these inci-
dents came in August 2010, when the Clipper Adventurer 
grounded on an underwater cliff in Coronation Gulf in the 
Northwest Passage. Although there was no loss of life or 
environmental catastrophe, the incident showed the stark 
reality of the individual, cultural, and environmental risks 
associated with polar travel, and it should send a warning 
to decision makers about the complexities of managing and 
governing cruise activities in Arctic waters. After an over-
view of Arctic cruise trends in Canada, we explore briefly 
what happened to the Clipper Adventurer during the sum-
mer of 2010 and comment on the implications of that inci-
dent for the governance of cruise tourism in Arctic Canada, 
particularly in relation to safety issues.
CRUISE SHIP TOURISM IN ARCTIC CANADA
Historically, ice conditions have precluded most commer-
cial shipping in the Arctic. The first tourist voyage through 
the Northwest Passage by the Explorer in 1984 aroused 
sufficient interest in the region to warrant similar transits 
(Marsh and Staple, 1995; Jones, 1999); however, only two 
other crossings were successful during the next four years 
(Marsh and Staple, 1995). From 1992 to 2005, a more regu-
lar pattern of cruise activity emerged: not only were there 
one to three successful voyages through the Northwest Pas-
sage each year, but cruise ships also visited other locations 
in the Canadian Arctic such as Baffin Island, Hudson Bay, 
and Ellesmere Island. The trend toward a more sustained 
Arctic cruise industry in Canada was solidified in 2006, 
when 22 cruises operated in the region—double the number 
observed during the previous season (Buhasz, 2006). Over 
the four following years, the number of planned cruises 
increased by an average of 9.5% each year. The 2009 cruise 
season was the busiest on record, with 26 planned cruises. 
As was observed in 2010, cruise ship activity for the 2011 
season is likely to decrease as a consequence of the global 
economic recession (Stewart et al., 2010). In addition, the 
absence this year of the Inuit-operated cruise vessel Lyubov 
Orlova will eliminate the seven tourist cruises that it nor-
mally operates. However, the market of individuals seek-
ing to experience the Canadian Arctic by sea is expected to 
grow from 2012 onwards, reflecting the dramatic growth in 
travel to Antarctica (Lück et al., 2010).
The patterns of cruise activity reveal a great deal of 
variability across the Canadian Arctic region. Eastern and 
southern Baffin Island destinations, such as Cape Dorset, as 
well those on the shores of Hudson Bay, such as Churchill, 
have witnessed a decline in cruise activity in recent years 
(Stewart et al., 2010), but more cruises have moved into the 
northern, central, and western regions, and most dramati-
cally, through the Northwest Passage. In 2010, the North-
west Passage experienced the highest volume of cruise ship 
landings (community and shore visits) in the industry’s 
history, representing a 57% increase from 2006 (Table 1). 
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the majority of inci-
dents involving cruise ships have occurred in this stretch of 
water.
THE GROUNDING OF THE CLIPPER ADVENTURER
In 1975, the Alla Tarasova was built in the former Yugo-
slavia as an expedition and research vessel purposely 
designed for travel to the polar regions, with an A-1 ice 
class rating. In 1998, under the ownership of Clipper Cruise 
Line, the 4000-ton vessel was renamed Clipper Adven-
turer after being refitted as an expedition cruise ship with 
the capacity to accommodate 122 passengers. A sister 
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ship to the Lyubov Orlova, the vessel is currently owned 
by International Shipping Partners and sails under char-
ter to various cruise operators such as Quark Expeditions 
and Adventure Canada. The Clipper Adventurer regularly 
visits both polar regions, transiting the Arctic during the 
Northern Hemisphere summer and the Antarctic during the 
austral summer. The vessel had just begun to be a regular 
visitor to the Canadian Arctic with her first voyage through 
the Northwest Passage in 2009. 
In 2010, the Clipper Adventurer was scheduled to com-
plete four cruises to various locations throughout the region, 
including the High Arctic, Baffin Island, and the Northwest 
Passage. During a cruise advertised as “Into the Northwest 
Passage,” the Clipper Adventurer was chartered by Adven-
ture Canada, and made visits to Pond Inlet, Beechey Island, 
Gjoa Haven, and Bathurst Inlet before running aground 
two days before the end of the voyage. On 27 August, while 
making its way from Port Epworth to Kugluktuk, Nunavut, 
the vessel ran into a known hazard in Coronation Gulf at 
67˚58ʹ N, 112 4˚0ʹ W, approximately 100 km east of Kugluk-
tuk. The seas were calm, sunny conditions prevailed, and 
good visibility with no wind or swell was reported at the 
time of the incident. According to local news reports, the 
ship’s hull suffered serious damage, and watertight com-
partments were ruptured, although the ship’s interior did 
not take in water, and no oil spills were reported. Although 
the ship was listing at about 4.5˚ to port (Fig. 1), all 118 pas-
sengers and 69 crew members were safe and unharmed dur-
ing the incident. As reported by Adventure Canada, efforts 
by the ship’s crew to dislodge the vessel during high tide on 
28 August were unsuccessful. As a consequence, the Cana-
dian Coast Guard (CCG) dispatched the nearest icebreaker, 
the Amundsen, to assist the stranded ship. The icebreaker 
was 500 km away in the Beaufort Sea, but was on the scene 
by 0900 the following day.
As explained by Church et al. (2010:38), researchers 
from the University of New Brunswick’s (UNB) Ocean 
Mapping Group who were on the Amundsen at the time of 
the grounding, Coronation Gulf is transected by a num-
ber of island chains known as the Coronation Sills. These 
geological features “are steep (often vertical) and allow lit-
tle opportunity for a vessel to avoid [them] if approached 
without prior knowledge.” Adventure Canada CEO Mat-
thew Swan reported to the CBC news channel, “we were on 
a single line track here that indicated we had 68 metres of 
water directly under us, when we found ourselves on a rock 
... It’s a part of the world where you do your best, but there 
are blank spots on the map.” However, the Canadian Hydro-
graphic Service had reported these escarpment features in 
2007, and the CCG (2007a) had issued a notice to shipping 
in the same year. It is the responsibility of the ship’s offic-
ers to update their own charts and note these hazards when 
they are issued; in the case of the Clipper Adventurer, this 
was reportedly not done.
On the northern side of Coronation Gulf, chartered ship-
ping lanes have been established to avoid these navigation 
hazards, but apart from earlier surveying by the Amundsen 
in 2005 – 06, little is known about the southern region of 
Coronation Gulf. As a consequence, the Clipper Adventurer 
ran aground on a hazard that the crew could easily have 
avoided if they had been working with updated charts, or 
if serendipitously the vessel had tracked a course just a few 
ship lengths to the east or to the west (Hydro International, 
2010). As the region is poorly charted and also known to 
possess challenging geological features, travel to rescue 
the stricken Clipper Adventurer was also hazardous for the 
icebreaker Amundsen. However, the researchers onboard 
the Amundsen were able to chart a safe course using high-
resolution multi-beam sonar from the ship’s barge. The safe 
corridor allowed the Amundsen to travel both to the Clipper 
Adventurer and then onward to the community of Kugluk-
tuk, from where the passengers were flown to Edmonton, 
arriving on 30 August. 
The surveys completed by UNB researchers were also 
used by other Coast Guard ships assisting with the recov-
ery of the Clipper Adventurer. The Resolve Marine Group 
was awarded the salvage of the cruise ship. The salvage 
team arrived on the ship on 29 August and, as soon as the 
Amundsen had evacuated the passengers, began to assess 
the damage. The team removed fuel and closed breaches in 
the hull in preparation to refloat and tow the vessel to Cam-
bridge Bay for repairs. Salvage personnel also flew in from 
Yellowknife, Northwest Territories (Marine Log, 2010). By 
the end of September 2010, the Coast Guard had towed the 
ship out of the region (Fig. 2).  
Despite the difficulties faced in the 2010 season, the 
Clipper Adventurer is scheduled to take passengers on five 
separate cruises through Arctic Canada in 2011, including 
TABLE 1. Total community and shore landings by region (after Stewart et al., 2010; Dawson et al., 2011).
 Community and shore landings1 % change
Region 2006 2008 2009 2010 2006–10
High Arctic 3 3 2 8 +63%
Northwest Passage 20 23 36 47 +57%
Baffin Bay 47 37 20 25 -68%
Hudson Bay, Newfoundland and Labrador 25 14 14 20 -25%
Total 95 77 72 100 +5%
 1 Data for 2005 and 2007 are not available.
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tours to Baffin Island, Newfoundland and Labrador, and 
through the Northwest Passage. The vessel will be operat-
ing the “Arctic Safari” cruise for the recently reconfigured 
Inuit-operated cruise company, Cruise North Expeditions 
(Cruise North Expeditions, 2011), and in addition, will be 
under charter to Adventure Canada. It is anticipated that 
the Clipper Adventurer will be the busiest cruise ship in the 
Canadian Arctic in 2011. During the austral summer, the 
vessel is also expected to make seven trips to the Antarctic 
Peninsula (Quark Expeditions, 2011). 
DISCUSSION
The unfortunate grounding of the Clipper Adventurer 
gives rise to pressing questions for the cruise industry in 
the Canadian Arctic. For instance, how can risk be mini-
mized for the increasing number of cruise ships and tourists 
visiting the Canadian Arctic? What can be learned from the 
grounding that will help improve future cruise operations in 
the Arctic, particularly with regard to safety? What volun-
tary and regulatory mechanisms are required to ensure the 
Arctic cruise industry meets appropriate safety and envi-
ronmental protection standards? The anticipated growth 
in the cruise sector, in combination with increasing debate 
over sovereignty in Canada’s Arctic waterways (Huebert, 
2001) and the possibility of increased hazards in the North-
west Passage (Stewart et al., 2007), makes addressing these 
questions critically important. Although hazardous ice 
was not a factor in the Clipper’s grounding, incidents may 
accelerate because ice conditions in this stretch of water 
will become more unpredictable as the Northwest Passage 
transitions to an ice-free summer. The prevalence of multi-
year ice may be particularly problematic for transiting ves-
sels (Stewart et al., 2007).
It was a matter of good fortune that the Amundsen was 
relatively close to the Clipper Adventurer, and even more 
fortunate that the icebreaker was carrying the appropriate 
equipment and operational expertise to map a safe res-
cue course, which allowed the Amundsen access to the 
grounded ship “without risk of succumbing to the same 
fate” (Church et al., 2010:38). Why the crew of Clipper 
Adventurer was unaware of a charted hazard is currently 
a matter of speculation, but it is clear that the approach 
adopted by the Amundsen minimized the risk associated 
with the evacuation of passengers from the cruise ship to 
the icebreaker and onward to Kugluktuk. Without doubt 
the CCG greatly increased the efficiency and effective-
ness of the rescue under difficult conditions (Church et al., 
2010). However, it is impossible to guarantee that the Coast 
Guard will be close enough to provide search and rescue 
services to stricken cruise ships in the vast and increasingly 
busy waterways of the Canadian Arctic. Under normal cir-
cumstances, the CCG’s response time could be 10 hours or 
more, depending on ice, weather, hydrographic, and other 
conditions (CCG, 2007b, 2008). While six icebreakers are 
deployed to the Arctic in summer, and while search-and-
rescue operations take precedence in CCG operations, 
expecting this small fleet of icebreakers to cover such a 
vast area of waterways is unrealistic. The fortunate circum-
stances that permitted the rescue of the Clipper Adventurer 
in 2010 may not prevail during future incidents.
Fear of future incidents, along with the desire to exer-
cise sovereignty over the Arctic region, has placed Arctic 
marine governance at the forefront of northern policy issues 
in Canada (Government of Canada, 2010). The federal gov-
ernment has already begun to revise reporting and moni-
toring policies in Arctic waters, including a change in July 
2010 to NORDREG (Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Ser-
vices), which for the first time made it mandatory for ves-
sels over 300 tonnes to report to the CCG while operating in 
Arctic waters. However, according to CCG and Transport 
Canada representatives, more than 98% of vessels operating 
in Arctic waters were already reporting to the CCG even 
when it was voluntary. It is therefore questionable whether 
FIG. 2. The Clipper Adventurer being towed out of the North-
west Passage in the vicinity of Pond Inlet in September 2010. 
(Photo: Michael Peterloosie.)
FIG. 1. The Clipper Adventurer grounded in Coronation Gulf, 
August 2010. (Photo: Sven Commandeur.)
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this policy change will make any appreciable difference 
beyond reiterating the view that Canada is asserting sov-
ereignty over what it considers to be internal waters. This 
change has been criticized as being meaningless in prac-
tice considering it will capture only the 2% of vessels that 
were not previously reporting. Perhaps more relevant would 
be significant federal investment in additional icebreak-
ers and other infrastructure for enforcement, search-and- 
rescue, environmental disaster prevention, and clean-up and 
salvage operations. Although the federal government has 
committed CDN$800 million to procuring one new polar 
icebreaker, which is expected to have greater icebreaking 
capabilities than any other ship operating under the CCG, 
this ship will simply replace the CCGS Louis S. St-Laurent, 
which is expected to be decommissioned in 2017 (CCG, 
2011). Thus, at present there seem to be no plans to make 
additions to the currently operating Arctic fleet of six Cana-
dian icebreakers. It is also clear from the grounding of the 
Clipper Adventurer that significant research investment in 
charting Arctic waterways is overdue. Some federal fund-
ing has been allocated to this initiative, but it is not clear yet 
whether existing financial commitments will be sufficient.
It is vital, in order to ensure economic, socio-cultural, 
political, and environmental sustainability in the Arctic 
region, to identify and evaluate specific policies and regu-
lations that will enhance safety and security in and sover-
eignty over Canadian Arctic waters. It is also important to 
evaluate the institutional structures that actually implement 
and enforce the decisions that are made. Marine shipping is 
inherently complex, a situation reflected in the multilayered 
and multiscale nature of regulatory institutions. In addition 
to the umbrella framework provided by the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO), Canada has additional acts, 
regulations, legislation, and guidelines governing passenger 
ship operation in Canadian Arctic waterways. An array of 
federal and territorial organizations support the regulation 
and operation of passenger vessels in the Canadian Arctic, 
including the Canadian Coast Guard (search-and-rescue 
operations), the Department of National Defence (public 
safety and emergency preparedness), the Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans (vessel traffic monitoring services), 
Environment Canada (distribution of sea ice data), Parks 
Canada (protected areas), and the Canada Border Ser-
vices Agency (immigration and passport control), as well 
as all three northern territorial governments (Dawson et al., 
2011). It will be increasingly important to understand and 
perhaps streamline this complex governance framework as 
shipping, and particularly cruise shipping, becomes more 
prevalent in Arctic waters.
There is currently no single or common governing body 
that manages or supports the Arctic cruise sector in Can-
ada. However, in Greenland and Norway, where cruise 
tourism has had a much longer history than in Canada, such 
a body is relatively well developed (Stewart and Draper, 
2006; AECO, 2011). Throughout Svalbard, Jan Mayen, and 
Greenland, the cruise sector is overseen by the Associa-
tion of Arctic Expedition Cruise Operators (AECO). This 
international organization was founded in 2003 to manage 
Arctic cruises that are safe, friendly to the environment, 
and beneficial to Arctic communities (AECO, 2011). Like 
the International Association of Antarctica Tour Opera-
tors (IAATO), which includes many Arctic cruise operators 
among its members, AECO acts as a representative body 
offering information, guidelines, and voluntary policies 
for operating cruise ships in the European Arctic (AECO, 
2011). Although Arctic Canada falls outside the regional 
remit of AECO, the grounding of the Clipper Adventurer 
should provide impetus to create a new body, or to extend 
the remit of IAATO or AECO to the Canadian Arctic.
CONCLUSION
The Northwest Passage is a “honey pot” for cruising 
in the Canadian Arctic because it combines good wild-
life viewing opportunities with the unrivalled chance to 
witness relics of the historical exploration of the Passage 
(Stewart et al., 2010). However, it has also been the location 
of various incidents involving cruise and other vessels (such 
as the tanker Nanny, which ran aground shortly after the 
Clipper), and more accidents are likely to occur there in the 
future (Stewart et al., 2007). John Hughes, director of the 
UNB Ocean Mapping Group onboard the Amundsen, noted 
that cruise ships are tending to deviate from safe shipping 
lanes toward “riskier areas…where there is more dramatic 
topography or stunning wildlife” (Hydro International, 
2010). The grounding of the Clipper Adventurer therefore 
evoked little surprise, and although we do not wish to sen-
sationalize the possibility of further incidents, neither can 
we dismiss it. While management cannot handle all eventu-
alities in this remote polar environment, increased attention 
is clearly needed to streamline the cruise sector’s complex 
governance structure, maximize benefits to local communi-
ties, and minimize risks to human life and to the environ-
ment. Good fortune may be running out.
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